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NOTES
INTRODUCTION

In 1954, the Temporary Commission on the Courts conducted
hearings for the purpose of determining whether the Civil Practice
Act, hereinafter referred to and cited as CPA, should be completely
modernized, or amended in a piecemeal manner.1 There was virtual
unanimity in favor of a complete modernization.2 To effect this
revision, an Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure was
appointed. The product of its labor is New York's new Civil
Practice Law and Rules, effective September 1, 1963, hereinafter
referred to and cited as CPLR.
Article 3 of the CPLR, covering jurisdiction, service and
appearance has been designed to utilize the "state's constitutional
power over persons and things," to the fullest degree, to simplify
the manner of service, to require methods of service that will
increase the likelihood of actual notice and to eliminate the special
appearance.3
The most important of these is the expansion of jurisdiction.
Since the United States Supreme Court's announcement of the
"minimum contacts" doctrine in the case of Internatio-nal Shoe Co.
v. Washington,4 many other states have expanded their statutory
basis for asserting jurisdiction. In these states, attorneys have
become accustomed to view jurisdiction as a predicate to service,
and not service as the basis of jurisdiction. 5 Now, since New
York has broadened its basis of jurisdiction, attorneys in this state
may also have to think in terms of jurisdictional predicate, i.e., the
basis for the acquisition of jurisdiction being those activities which
satisfy the requirement of "minimum contacts."
1 1962 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 8, SIxTH REPORT To THE LEGISLATURE By THE
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE
ACT 25 (hereinafter cited as SIXTH REP.).

2 Ibid.

3 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, SECOND PRELIMINARY
ADVISORY COMMIrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
SECOND REP.).

REPORT OF THE

37 (hereinafter cited as

4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 This distinction between jurisdictional predicate and notice was pointed
out by the Supreme Court in the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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It is the purpose of this note to contrast the provisions of
Article 3 of the CPLR with the CPA within the context of other
statutory provisions and decisional law which affect the area.
JURISDICTION

At the outset a basic distinction should be noted between subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction which involves the power
of a court over persons, property and status because of the relationship that each has with the forum state.6 The former involves
the competency of a particular court to hear a case involving a
particular matter.7 Thus, the monetary limit placed on causes of
action which can be brought in a particular court, such as the limit
placed on the New York City Civil Court,8 is an example of subject-matter jurisdiction. This note discusses jurisdiction which
goes to the power of a court over persons, property and status
since the only provisions of article 3 dealing with subject-matter
jurisdiction are the removal provisions.9
Section 301-A "Catchall" Provision
The first provision in article 3 relating to jurisdiction operates
as somewhat of a "catchall" for the traditional methods of acquiring jurisdiction in New York. 10 As pointed out by the revisers,
section 301:
is designed to make it clear that neither proposed section 3.2 [302] nor any
similar provision which deals with the acquisition of jurisdiction in particular situations supersedes or operates as a limitation upon acquisition of
jurisdiction over persons, property or status as previously permitted by law
6 See 1 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTCE 64-69
(1953). For a recent comprehensive treatment of jurisdiction which involves
the power of a court over persons, property and status, see Note, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 909 (1960).
7 1 CARMODY-WAIT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 65-66.

8 N.Y. CITY Civ. CT. ACT. § 7.
9 CPLR § 325 (grounds for removal): (a) by the supreme court where,
there has been a mistake in the choice of court, (b) from a court of
limited jurisdiction where the court in which the action is pending does
not have jurisdiction to grant the relief to which the parties are entitled,
(c) removal to a lower court where it appears that the amount of damages
sustained are less than demanded under certain conditions, (d) from
supreme court to surrogate's court where the action pending affects the
administration of a decedent's estate which is within the jurisdiction of the
surrogate's court of the county of Bronx, Kings, Nassau, New York,
Queens, Richmond or Westchester, and (e) to the supreme court where
a county judge is incapable of acting in an action pending in the county
court.
See present provisions in CPA §§ 110-110-b, 190 (substantially
unchanged by CPLR). See CPLR R. 326 (procedure on removal).
10 CPLR § 301: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons,
property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore."
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and judicial decision or as permitted by this proposed article or any other
present or future provision."1

However, the exact scope of this section is not clear. Specifically,
it is not clear whether the section includes: (1) the common law
bases for the acquisition of jurisdiction, or (2) the bases for acquisition provided presently by the CPA, or (3) the jurisdictional
bases provided by statutes which are independent of the CPA and
CPLR, or (4) all three. It would seem certain that under section
301 the traditional concepts which are used to acquire jurisdiction
are retained: (1) physical presence within the state, (2) domicile
within the state even though the party is not within the state, and
12 (3) consent as a basis for jurisdiction, either expressed or implied.
Although not expressly retained by section 301, the revisers
point out that the basis of jurisdiction provided for by Section
229-b of the CPA will still be available under the CPLR. 13 Section
229-b provides for the acquisition of jurisdiction over nonresident
natural persons who "engage in business" within the state on causes
of action which arise out of the conduct of that business. Under
this section the defendant must be engaged in such business at the
time of the service of summons as a condition to the acquisition of
jurisdiction. 14
Also left unaffected by section 301 will be the jurisdictional
predicate of "doing business," so as to be found "present" within
the state, which is utilized to assert jurisdiction over unauthorized
foreign corporations. 15 This concept has developed by case law in
New York. The proposition was stated in the case of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. by Judge Cardozo:
We are to say . . .whether its business is such that it is here.

If in fact it

is here.., not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then . . . it is within the jurisdiction of our
courts.

16

The keynote is that the business must be fairly regular and systematic 17 even though it is not necessary that the corporation maintain
11 SECOND REP.

38.

12 For a basic discussion of these concepts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CONFLcr OF LAWS §§ 78-81 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Note, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 909, 935-48 (1960).
13 SECOND REP. 38.
For an analysis of this section, see PRASHKER,
NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 98-99 (4th ed. 1959).
14

CPA § 229-b.

15 For a discussion of the development of this concept in New York,
see 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, LAW REVISION CoMmi'x REPORT 94-106.
16220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917). Whether a corporation
is "doing business" is a question of fact. Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N.Y.
529, 58 N.E.2d 719 (1944).
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
Schwartz v. Breakers Hotel Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 508, 178 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
17 Meinhard, Grief & Co. v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan
Co., 262 App.
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an office in the state. Thus, in the case of Benware v. Acme Chemical Co.,' 8 jurisdiction was obtained over a foreign corporation which
had no office, bank account or property within the state but which
maintained six: salesmen under constant supervision on a full-time
basis within the state. It is important to note that under the "doing
business" concept jurisdiction is acquired even though the cause of
action does not arise out of business transacted within the state.19
Thus it is clear that even under the CPLR, the practitioner will
not be restricted to the provisions of article 3 but will also be able
to utilize statutory provisions which are independent of the CPLR
and which,2 0 depending on the circumstances, might be more to his
advantage.

Present Statutory Provisions Other Than
The Civil Practice Act
Generally speaking the statutory schemes which provide for the
acquisition of jurisdiction independently of the CPA and CPLR fall
within the two conceptual categories: (1) bases founded upon certain activities within the state, and (2) bases founded upon consent.
Those statutes which base jurisdiction on activities within the
state can best be illustrated by Sections 59-a(2) of the Insurance
Law, 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and 250 of the General
Business Law. Although all three provide for the implied appointment of an official of the state as attorney upon whom process may
be served, the basis of jurisdiction is in fact the activities set out by
these sections.
Section 59-a(2) of the Insurance Law provides for the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over an unauthorized insurer if it
engages either by mail or otherwise in:
(1) the issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this
state or to corporations authorized to do business therein, (2) the solicitation of applications for such contracts, (3) the collection of premiums,
membership fees, assessments or other considerations for such contracts, or
(4) any other transaction of business .... 21

Div. 122, 28 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dep't 1941) (Texas corporation held
"doing business" where it maintained New York office for twenty years in
its own name for its own use under the auspices of three buyers).
18284 App. Div. 760, 135 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't 1954). See Sterling
Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distrib. Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564
(1949) (jurisdiction obtained over foreign corporation which had no local
office but made all purchases through domestic corporation which acted as
its exclusive buying agent) ; Holzer v. Dodge Bros., 233 N.Y. 216, 135 N.E.
268 (1922) (foreign corporation with no local office selling cars to dealers
within state deemed not to be "doing business").
1OTauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
20 SECOND REP. 455 (which contains a comprehensive analysis of these
statutory nrovisions).
21 N.Y. INs. LAW § 59-a (2).
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It provides that the commission of any of the acts enumerated is
equivalent to an appointment of the Superintendent of Insurance as
attorney for the insurer upon whom service of process may be made.
This section has been construed as conferring jurisdiction where a
22
single act falling within the enumerated categories has been shown.
Section 59-a(2) has been interpreted as not being available to
a nonresident suing an unauthorized insurer. 23 Qn the other hand,
it has been interpreted as being available in a suit 2by
an authorized
4
foreign corporation against an unauthorized insurer.
Many states have enacted legislation providing for the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over nonresident motorists involved in
an accident or collision while operating a vehicle within its borders.2 5 Section 253 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law
allows for the acquisition of such jurisdiction where there is: (1) the
use or operation of a vehicle in this state by a nonresident, (2) the
use or operation of a vehicle in this state in the business of a nonresident, or (3) the use or operation of a vehicle in this state owned
by a nonresident if so used or operated with his permission, express
or implied. Such operation or ownership is deemed an appointment
of the 6 Secretary of State as attorney upon whom service can be
2
made.

There are similar statutory provisions which allow for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction where the basis is certain activities within the state. They apply to the operation of an aircraft
within the state, 27 to nonresident employers, 28 nonresident securities
dealers, 29 and nonresident charitable organizations. 30
22

Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953) (jurisdiction sustained where a single policy
of insurance covering hotel in New Hampshire was delivered by unauthorized
foreign insurer by mail to New York resident).
23 Clifton Prods. Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp.

842 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

24Aero Associates, Inc. v. La Metropolitana, 183 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.

1960).

25 See, e.g.,
STAT. ANN. tit
26 The basis

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 952, § 9-301 (Smith-Hurd 1957); PA.
75, §2001 (1960).
for the acquisition of such jurisdiction is the state's interest
in regulating local acts which are dangerous to life or property. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
27 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 250 (language similar to § 253 of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law). Predecessor of § 250 was held unconstitutional in the case
of Peters v. Robin Airlines, insofar as it allowed the acquisition of jurisdiction where accidents or collisions occurred outside the state which had

no causative connection to acts done within the limits of the state.
App.2 Div. 903, 170 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1953)
8 N.Y. WoRxMms's CoMp. LAW § 150-a.
29 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-b.
3
0 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 482-d.

281

(memorandum decision).
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In certain areas New York exacts as a condition precedent to
the performance of certain activities within its borders, that there
be a consent to the personal jurisdiction of its courts. The best
example of this is the foreign corporation. Under Section 210 of
the General Corporation Law, a foreign corporation, before it can
receive a qualifying certificate, must designate the Secretary of State
as agent upon whom service can be made. This is provided for under
the new Business Corporation Law by section 304(b).31 The Business Corporation Law under section 307(a) will additionally. provide for such designation where an unauthorized foreign corporation
which either itself or through an agent "does any business" in this
state on any cause of action which arises out of or in connection with
the doing of such business.3 2 A study of the revisers' notes to the
Business Corporation Law does not make it exactly clear what is
meant by the "doing of business." It may have reference to the
"doing business" concept which has generally been a basis for the
acquisition of jurisdiction. 38
A provision similar to Section 210 of the General Corporation
Law is'Section 59(1) of the Insurance Law which provides that
foreign insurance companies seeking to do business within the state
must designate the Superintendent of Insurance as attorney upon
whom process can be served "on a contract delivered or issued for
delivery or a cause of action arising in this state ...... 34
Other statutory provisions which base jurisdiction on consent
cover joint stock associations,3 5 foreign banks and nonresident licensed lenders, 36 foreign insurance carriers, 37 foreign fiduciaries and
executors, administrators, testamentary trustees and guardians. 38
As can be seen, these statutory provisions represent a piecemeal
approach to expanding personal jurisdiction in New York. In recent
31 While § 210 is limited to foreign corporations other than moneyed
corporations, § 304(b) of the new Business Corporation Law will not be
so restricted. See present related provisions concerning foreign corporations
in N.Y. GN. CoRp. LA- §§ 213, 214-a.
32See N.Y. Bus. Cm. LAW § 305 which is a permissive provision for
the designation of a registered agent in addition to the secretary of state.
33 When initially recommended, this was its meaning.
See 1944 N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 65, LAw REvlsIOzsComm'N REIoRT 379, 396. There would
seem to be three reasons for construing this provision of §307(a) as
meaning "transacts business" rather than "doing business": (1) the subsequent
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
(2) § 302 of the CPLR which expresses an intent in New York to go to the
limits of constitutional jurisdiction; and (3) the wording of the statute itself
which refers to causes of action "arising out of or in connection xvith the
doing of such business."
34N.Y. I's. LAW § 59(1).
35N.Y. GFN. Ass'xs LAW § 18.
36 N.Y. BANKING LAW 8§ 200(3), 343-a.
37 N.Y. VEKiCLE & TRAnmc LAW §344(1).
38 N.Y. SuRR. CT. Acr § 95.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 37

years as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 9 states have sought a more comprehensive
approach to acquiring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents and
40
New York has followed this trend by its provision under the CPLR.
JurisdictionalExpansion
Section 302 of the CPLR represents the new attitude in New
York to the problem of acquiring jurisdiction over nonresidents, and
is a more comprehensive approach in this area.
The broad language of the provision recommended by the committee encompasses and goes beyond these particular statutes, "and it represents a
culmination of the trend that they indicate. 41

The statute's importance requires its full rendition in the text:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in
this section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state,
if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely
upon this section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with
respect to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in this
42
section.

The statute has been modeled on Section 17 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act. 43 Thus an analysis of the cases interpreting that statute and comparable statutes may provide the New York practitioner
with some insight into Section 302 of the CPLR.
39 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

40 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1962).
41 Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 COLUM.
L. REv. 50, 66 (1960).
See SECOND REP. 40-41.
42

Subdivision (b)

acts as a limitation on the section.

See 1961 N.Y.

LEG. Doc. No. 8, FIFTH REPORT To THE LEGISLATURE By THE SENATE
FINANCE CommiTFE
ON THE RIVSION OF THE CIVIL PRAcTCE ACT

67 (hereinafter cited as FrrrH REP.).
43 Certain provisions of the Illinois Act were not incorporated in § 302
because they were already provided for by other statutes. See SECOND REP.
39.
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Section 302(a) (1) - Transacts Any Business Within the State
It should be noted at the outset that:
In defining the term "transaction of business," the "doing business" cases may
not be ignored, particularly where the court found against the defendant
on this issue. 44

The "doing business" concept will provide a foundation from which

to start since "transacts any business" will operate as less of a reboth quantitatively and qualitatively than does the former
quirement
45
concept.
The problem posed by this subdivision is where to set a limit
to the acquisition of jurisdiction on the basis of the constitutional
requirement of "minimum contacts" as set forth in the International
Shoe case.4 6 The cases construing the Illinois provision provide
some insight but do not provide a clear guideline. Thus, in the case
of Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co.,47 personal jurisdiction was
sustained over defendant foreign corporation who, through an agent
personally present in Illinois, solicited and secured two purchase
orders from plaintiff for vending machines which were to be shipped
from Colorado. Defendant was to provide a factory-trained serviceman who was to train the prospective purchaser. On the other hand,

44 O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction Over NonResidents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 223,
236 n.69 (1956).
45 See the comprehensive discussion in the 1959 Report for a provision
similar to § 302 of the CPLR which was designed to operate in regard to
foreign corporations only. 1959 N.Y. La. Doc. No. 65, LAw REviSioN
REPORT 69.
Comax'N
46
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958).
Jurisdiction was sustained
under the Illinois provision where the activities included: (1) a contract
which consisted of a letter mailed by defendant from Sweden and a telegram
of acceptance sent by plaintiff from Chicago, and (2) prior to the contract
defendant's representative made two visits to Illinois to negotiate with
plaintiff's representatives the terms of the contract and to observe equipment
tests. National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th
Cir. 1959).
Jurisdiction has been denied in the following cases: Instill v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959) (activities consisted of mailing out-of-town newspapers to subscribers in Illinois and
shipping them to distributors within the state); Kaye-Martin v. Brooks,
267 F2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959) (contract negotiated in New York, defendant
came into Chicago to meet with plaintiff and contract completed in Texas) ;
Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957) (activities
consisted of defendant's acceptance of plaintiff's services in Illinois for its
incorporation in Delaware and for the reristry of its stock in Washington,
D.C.); E Film Corp. v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 277
(N.D. Ill. 1958) (contract executed in another state and defendant's only
contact with Illinois was the visit of one of its officers for the negotiation
of the contract).
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in the case of Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,48 the court
found no jurisdiction where defendant's activities consisted of sending catalogues through the mails into Illinois. The mere shipment of
49
goods into the state has been held insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
The cases turn on their individual facts and a consistent pattern cannot yet be discerned.
Some jurisdictions have statutory schemes which are more explicit and somewhat broader in scope than the Illinois provision.50
In the case of Wood~ring v. Crozmn Eng'r Co., 5 ' the Florida court
allowed the acquisition of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation who, through a sales representative in the state, placed certain
advertisements in a newspaper to promote the sale of its products
within the state. Maryland expressly provides for the acquisition
of jurisdiction on a cause of action arising out of a contract made
within its borders. 52 In the -landmark case of Compania de Astral,
S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 53 the court asserted jurisdiction on the
basis of a contract for the purchase of three ships. The contract had
been drafted in Maryland, revised and substantially agreed upon in
New York, and signed by the defendant in Panama and the plaintiff

48 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
49 Morgan v. Heckle, 171
Addo Mach. Co., 18 Ill. App.
2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959)
and shipped goods into Illinois

F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill. 1959); Groback v.
2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1958), af'd, 16 III.
(defendant accepted orders outside the state
by independent carriers).
ANN. § 47.16 (2) (Supp. 1960):
"Any person,

50 See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
firm or corporation which through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors
sells, consigns, or leases, by any means whatsoever, tangible or intangible
personal property, to any person, firm or corporation in this state, shall be
conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying
on a business or business venture in this state." This section has been
construed as not conferring jurisdiction where there was a shipment of
goods to a single customer, who was not a broker, jobber, wholesaler or
distributor, from a point outside the state. Newark Ladder & Bracket
Co. v. Eadie, 125 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1961).
51 141 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
52 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92 (d) (1957):
"Suits on ContractsEvery foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State by a resident
of this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this State
on any cause of action arising out of a contract made within this State
or liability incurred for acts done within this State, whether or not such
foreign corporation is doing or has done business in this State."
Wanamaker v. Lewis, 153 F. Supp. 195 (D. Md. 1957), where defendant,
a national radio network, purchased the right to use and did use locallyowned facilities of affiliated stations in Maryland and extended transmission
lines into Maryland for local dissemination of advertising, it was held to
constitute "doing business."
This represents a liberal trend in Maryland
of construing the "doing business" concept. However, the mere solicitation
of orders withih the state has been held not sufficient for the assertion
of jurisdiction. Arundel Crane Serv., Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md.
387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957).
53205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954). cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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in Maryland. The court found that the contract was made in Maryland because the last necessary act had been performed there.
Although judicial interpretation of "transacts business within
the state" represents a continuing development toward expansion of
jurisdiction, it is important to note that section 302(a) (1) is limited to causes of action arising out of the transaction of business.
Thus, the practitioner may still find the "presence" concept for acquisition of jurisdiction over unlicensed foreign corporations useful
since it does not have the same restriction. Also, since there is no
provision in section. 302 expressly covering unauthorized foreign insurers, the broader provision in Section 59-a of the Insurance Law
might prove more workable, since it does not have the limitation that
the cause of action
must arise out of the commission of any of the
54
acts enumerated.
With the expansion of jurisdiction that this subdivision represents, the constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction come
to the foreground.
Due Process
Under the due process clause, jurisdiction can be obtained over

a nonresident when there has been certain "minimum contacts" with
the forum state and when the nonresident has been given reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard.
In the case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,55 the Supreme Court stated the constitutional test of "minimum contacts":
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 56
The difficulty of applying such a broad test is readily appreciated.
Its application requires a balancing of certain interests against the
inconvenience of the defendant. In many instances the size of the

defendant will be an important consideration, since it might prove an
undue hardship to in effect force him to come in and defend an action
in a foreign jurisdiction."
Thus, generalization becomes impossible
because in the balancing of interests the facts of each case become
controlling.

5
4 See SEcoND REP. 39.
55 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (activities consisted of having considerable number
of salesmen in Washington, a substantial volume of business there and' at
times the maintenance of sample display rooms in the state).
56Id. at 316.
57 See Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 CoLtus. L. RZv. 1431,
1435-36 (1962).
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In the case of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,58 the Court

sustained jurisdiction where defendant, a nonresident insurer, had
solicited and delivered a reinsurance contract into California and the
insured had mailed premiums from that state until his death. The
Court noted California's "manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims." 59 The Court held that it was "sufficient for purposes of
due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State." 60 However, under the due process
clause the power of acquiring jurisdiction is not unbridled. A year
later, in the case of Hanson v. Denckla,61 the Supreme Court refused
to recognize the acquisition of jurisdiction. That case involved an
inter vivos trust which had been executed with a Delaware trust
company by the settlor who at the time was a Pennsylvania domiciliary. The settlor had reserved power of appointment and subsequently, while a domiciliary of Florida, executed an instrument
providing for the distribution of the trust corpus after her death.
While she was domiciled in Florida, the Delaware trust company
mailed to her checks covering income from the trust together with
communications concerning the administration of the trust. After
her death certain beneficiaries of her estate brought a proceeding in
the Florida courts to determine which assets passed under the residuary clause. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court did
not have jurisdiction:
We fail to find such contacts in the circumstances of this case. The defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and transacts no business
there. None of the trust assets has ever been held or administered
no solicitation of business in that State
in Florida, and the record discloses
62
either in person or by mail.

It has been noted that one conclusion which may be drawn from
the Hanson case is that "judicial jurisdiction is essentially a question
of reasonableness." 63 Reasonableness as a criterion is carried over
to the notice requirements.
In the case of Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.,6
the Supreme Court stated that due process requires the giving of
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
58355 U.S. 220 (1957).
See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950) (jurisdiction sustained over mail-order health insurance
association which had solicited membership in Virginia and which had about
800 members in that state).
59 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).

60 Ibid.

61357 U.S. 235 (1958).
62 Id. at 251.
63 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, LAw REvIsIoN Comm'N REPORT 114.
64 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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' 5
In holding that notice
opportunity to present their objections."
to settle the fiduciary acaction
an
by publication was insufficient in
counts of a common trust, the Court pointed out the distinction be6
tween the question of jurisdiction and that of adequate notice.
Once again the Court spoke in terms of reasonableness: "The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee, might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." 67 This approach
was adopted by the revisers of the CPLR, who expressly designed
the service provisions of article 3 to in fact provide actual notice
6
by restricting the use of publication. "
Thus, the due process requirements provide a somewhat broad
guideline-the emphasis being on reasonableness-from which the
courts functioning under expanded jurisdictional statutes can operate. Even though the due process requirements are met, jurisdiction
may be refused on the basis of the prohibition of the commerce
clause, i.e., the court's exercise of jurisdiction might be an undue
burden on interstate cominerce.

Commerce Clause
With the expansion of jurisdiction prompted by International
Shoe, the limitation imposed by the commerce clause 69 may take on
new prominence. 70 This was pointed out by implication in the case
71
of Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills.

There have been some

lower court decisions which have imposed the limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction because of an undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce. 72 The full scope of this limitation cannot be deter65
Id. at 314.
66

Id. at 313.
Id. at 315. The Supreme Court has approved personal service without
the state. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ; mailing of the
summons and complaint to defendant by registered mail, Travelers Health
Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 650-51 (1950). However, it has stated
that service by publication is inadequate except where no other means are
available. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
317 (1950).
67

68 FIFTr RF-r. 273-74.

69Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). See the
discussion in McGowan, Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33
ILL. L. REv. 875 (1939).

70 See Weinstein, Civil Practice Trends, 62 COLUm! L. RFv. 1431, 1436,
(1962); Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960).
71239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
72 Burden on interstate commerce, Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. Fawcett,
269 N.Y. 379, 199 N.E. 628 (1936); Hershel Radio Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286 (1952). Burden on foreign commerce,
Overstreet v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Banque de France v. Supreme Court, 287 N.Y. 483, 41 N.E2d 65, cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 646 (1942).
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mined until further litigation in the area of expanding jurisdiction
prompts its consistent application.
Forum Non Conveniens-Need For Reconsideration
The expansion of jurisdiction not only raises problems of constitutional limitation, but also difficulties with regard to the limits
imposed by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Professor Weinstein points to the necessity for re-evaluating the doctrine as it presently exists in New York:
Our courts will b,- forced in far more cases than before to think hard
about balancing interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and our court system. The doctrine of forum non conveniens will require the courts to
decide whether "in the interest of substantial justice the action should be
heard in another forum," and whether the court should "stay or dismiss the
action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." 73

It is generally held under present New York law that a court
may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction where either the plaintiff or
defendant is a resident of the state. 74 However, where both parties
are nonresidents the courts have discretion to refuse to assert jurisdiction. 75 In the area of commercial transactions and causes of action affecting property or property rights the courts will generally
entertain jurisdiction between nonresidents on the basis of the commercial interest of the state. 76 There is express statutory provision
-Section 225 of the General Corporation Law-for the maintenance
of suits by a foreign corporation or nonresident against a foreign
1314 of
corporation in certain enumerated cases, and under Section
77
the Business Corporation Law there are certain additions.
73 Weinstein, supra note 70, at 1435.

See FIFTH REP. 67.

De Le Bouillerie v. DeVienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949);
see PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRACTICE §22 (3) (4th ed. 1959); Comment,
26 FORDHAm L. Rav. 534 (1957).
75 De La Bouillerie v. DeVienne, supra note 74. For a general discussion
of forum non conveniens see, 1 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK
PRACTICE 78-91 (1953).
74

76Wertheim v. Clerque, 53 App. Div. 122, 125 N.Y. Supp. 750 (1st
Dep't 1900); Van Der Veen v. Amsterdamsche Bank, 178 Misc. 668, 35

N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
77 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1314 (b):

"(1)

Where the action is to

recover damages for the breach of a contract made or to be performed

within this state, or relating to property situated within this state at the
(2) Where the subject matter of
time of the making of the contract.
the litigation is situated within this state. (3) Where the cause of action

arose within this state, except where the object of the action or special
proceedings is to affect the title of real property situated outside the state.
(4) Where the action or special proceeding is based on liability for acts
done within this state by a foreign corporation. (5) Where the defendant
is a foreign corporation doing business in this state." The changes: subparagraph (b) (1) permits actions to be brought upon contracts to be
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The area of re-evaluation will be the situations created by the
policy of generally allowing residents to assert jurisdiction without
limitation. Emphasis will also have to shift from the convenience
of the court to considerations of the convenience of nonresident
defendants:
The increased power afforded plaintiffs in our courts must be tempered by
some consideration for a defendant with widely scattered interests who may
be harassed by suits in different jurisdictions. More to the point perhaps
is the need for forbearance when the defendant is an individual residing
far from a state having but the slenderest contact with the dispute.7 8

Thus, the New York courts have to consider the expansion of jurisdiction in the light of the requirements imposed by the constitution
and also on the basis of an adjusted doctrine of forum non conveniens.
It is to be noted that the limitations discussed will be operative
with respect to all the bases for acquiring jurisdiction under section
302 and that the caveats apply as well to the commission of tortious
acts and the ownership, use or possession of real property within
the state.
Section 302(a) (2) -

Commits a Tortious Act

The provision of section 302 which relates to the commission
of a tortious act within the state may very well pose the greatest
problems in the area of acquiring personal jurisdiction. The issue
to be resolved is where was the tort committed. In certain areas it
is clear that the tort is committed within the state. On the facts presented in the case of Nelson v. Miller,79 it would seem that a court
would have very little difficulty in asserting jurisdiction. In that
case, defendant, a Wisconsin resident, sent one of his employees
into Illinois to deliver certain appliances, including a gas cooking
stove, to the plaintiff. Plaintiff, while assisting the employee in
unloading the stove, was injured because of the latter's negligence
and the court sustained jurisdiction on that basis. A case which
seems to be on the frontier of jurisdictional acquisition on the basis
of the commission of a tort, is Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 0 In that case defendant, an Ohio manufacturer

performed in this state, and subparagraph (b) (4) an addition which covers
all acts and liabilities of foreign corporations done within thie state. 1962
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 30, SIXTH INmTRIm REPORT OF THE JoiuT LEGISLATIVE
CommITTE To STUDY REVISION OF THE CORPORATION LAws 136-37.
78 Weinstein, supra note 70, at 1435.
79 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
See Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
8022 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); accord, Anderson v. Penncraft
Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961) Compare, Erlanger Mills v.
Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Hellriegel v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
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of safety valves, sold its products to a water heater manufacturer
whose plant was in Pennsylvania. The latter, after assembling the
heater, shipped it to the purchaser in Illinois who in turn sold it at
retail to the plaintiff who was injured by a defect in the safety valve.
The court in sustaining jurisdiction over the Ohio manufacturer
stated that "the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place
which is necessary to render the actor liable." 81 This is the American Law Institute position and would seem
to be the position which
82
will be adopted by the New York courts.

North Carolina has a statute which expressly provides for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a situation
similar to that presented by the facts in the Gray case.88 However, this 4statute was strictly construed and jurisdiction was not
8
sustained.
Another problem presented by the commission of the tortious
act provision is the tort of defamation. In the case of Insult v.
New York World-Telegram Corp.,s5 the court refused to find jurisdiction where the libel had been initiated and published outside of
Illinois and subsequently the newspapers containing the libel were
mailed and distributed in Illinois. New York has averted the prob-

81 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 434-35, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961).
82 RESTATEMFNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934):
1. Except in the case of harm from poison, when a person sitstainr
bodily harm, the place of wrong is the place where the harnful force takes
effect upon the body.
Illustration:
1. A. standing in state X, fires a gun and lodges a bullet in the
body of B who is standing in state Y. The place of wrong is state

Y.
3. Where harm is caused to land or chattels, the place of wrong is
the place where the force takes effect on the thing.
New York would seem to follow this position. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, NEW YORK ANNOTATIONS § 377.
It has been suggested that whether or not a tort has been committed

should depend on the reasonableness of requiring a defendant to stand trial
within the jurisdiction.

Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for

the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 609 (1955).
83 N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-145 (1960), provides for the acquisition of

jurisdiction over foreign cornorations regardless of whether or not it is
transacting business within the state on causes of action arising:
"(3)
Out of the nroduction, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such
corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be

used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regardless
of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold
or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers. .. ."
84 Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961)
(somewhat similar facts to the Gray case).
85

273 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960).
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lem by expressly excepting from its provision causes of action for
defamation of character; the basis for the exception rests on conthe free transference of
siderations of freedom 8 of
6 the press and
ideas across the nation.
One of the most perplexing problems raised by the tortious act
provision is the question of jurisdictional facts. What effect does
the tentative finding of the commission rc' a tortious act have on
the ultimate disposition of the merits and vice versa? In the Gray
case the court construed the concept of tortious act as one causing
damage as contrasted with the commission of a tort which would
require the establishment of liability, act and damage and thereby require a full trial on the merits.8 7 Would an ultimate disposition
that there was no tort committed result in obviating the court's
jurisdiction? Although on its face this would seem to be the logical result, it would operate to undercut the jurisdictional effectiveness of the tortious act provision. To so hold would expose the
defendant to a new trial in another state, since the rendering court's
lack of jurisdiction would preclude its determination on the merits
from having res judicata effect. The distinction between tortious
act and tort made by the court in the Gray case might provide a
workable solution in this area. Under this distinction, tortious act
would develop as a jurisdictional concept and would have no bearing on the question of whether a substantive tort had been committed. In like manner an ultimate disposition on the merits should
have no bearing on whether the court had jurisdiction.
The problem also arises in the area of default judgments and
collateral attack. Can a defendant, by not entering an appearance
in the state which bases jurisdiction on the tortious act provision,
when being sued on this judgment in another state force relitigation
of the merits by collaterally attacking the former state's jurisdiction, claiming that he did not commit a tort in that state? In the
case of Nelson v. Miller, the Illinois court reasoned that when a
default judgment is entered against a nonresident, his collateral attack could only raise the issue of whether he committed an act or
omission but not that the acts or omissions gave rise to liability
in tort.8 8 It is evident that these problems are not easily resolved
86 CPLR § 302(a) (2); see Weinstein, Civil Practice Trends, 62 CoLum.
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
L. REv. 1431, 1436 (1962).

144 87So. 2d 25 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1962).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note
81.
The position adopted in the Gray case would seem to be a practical
necessity. Otherwise, an elaborate pre-trial procedure would have to be
established which would tend to offset the effectiveness of the "tortious act"
provision by making its assertion burdensome on the courts.
(1) an act or
88 The jurisdictional facts that could be attacked:
omission in Illinois, (2) committed by defendant or his agent, and (3)
that the complaint state a cause of action arising out of such conduct.
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and will require a great deal of litigation before workable and
equitable solutions are found.
Due to the problems raised by the tortious act provision, the
practitioner may find it more convenient to avail himself of another basis for acquiring jurisdiction. If the cause of action involves injury resulting from a nonresident's operation of a vehicle
in the state, jurisdiction could be predicated on Section 253 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law. If the cause of action was one against
a foreign corporation, the practitioner might be able to base jurisdiction on the theory that the corporation's "doing business" constitutes "presence." In this instance the restriction that the cause
of action must arise out of the business done within the state would
not apply. If "presence" cannot be found, it might be argued that
eveiy act of a corporation constitutes the transaction of business
and therefore jurisdiction can be predicated on Section 302 (a) (1)
of the CPLR. A similar result might be achieved where a natural
person commits a tort in the transaction of his business. The practitioner's awareness of the interplay of these provisions in certain
instances might prove crucial to his success in pursuing his client's
claim beyond the jurisdictional requirements to a disposition on the
merits. This same awareness should be present when looking to
the provision which allows jurisdiction to be predicated where the
cause of action arises out of the ownership, use or possession of
any real property situated within the state.
Section 302(a) (3) - Ownership, Use or Possession of
Real Property Within the State
The scope of the subdivision which deals with the ownership, use
or possession of real property is not clear. Many of the cases construing comparable provisions in other states are generally involved
with tort actions which have arisen from the ownership of property.89 In the recent case of Porter v. Nahas 0 an Illinois court
sustained jurisdiction over a defendant who had been a tenant of
an apartment in Illinois while a resident of that state and had
subsequently moved to New York. The court in basing jurisdiction on the ownership provision of the Illinois statute reasoned that
tenancy even if only for one month would be sufficient to make the
provision operative.

Foster, Illinois Judgment Against Wisconsin Tortfeasor Who Was Personally
Served in Wisconsin, 30 Wis. BAR. Bum. 18, 57 (No. 6, 1957).
89 See 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, LAw REvisioN Comm'N 125. Where

the cause of action was based on contract, jurisdiction was denied in at
least one instance. Shouse v. Wagner, 84 Pa. D. & C. 82 (Allegheny
County Ct. 1952).
9035 IIl. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1st Dist. 1962).
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Pennsylvania has a more explicit statutory provision covering
the area of causes of action arising out of the ownership or possession of real estate within the state.9 1 In the case of Rumig v.
Ripley Mfg. Corp.,92 the statute was construed so as to acquire
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which had formed a Pennsylvania corporation expressly for the purpose of leasing a building
within that state. The court, after finding facts sufficient to disregard the corporate fiction of the domestic corporation, sustained
jurisdiction in a personal injury action arising from the lease of the
building. Wisconsin has a broad statutory provision 93 which raises
issues as to whether such ownership or possession of property can
be used to acquire jurisdiction in cases other than tort actions.
An illustration of such a case might serve to demonstrate the problems posed:
D, a resident of Delaware, has long been seeking a loan from P, a resident

of New Jersey. Negotiations for the loan, which took place in New Jersey,
had never come to fruition because of D's lack of security for the loan.
Subsequently D, because of an inheritance, comes into the ownership of an
office building in New York and apprises P of this fact who now becomes
interested in giving the loan.

P gives D a loan of $175,000 and exacts from

D a bond covering the amount and a mortgage which constituted a first lien
on the building in New York.

The mortgage was executed according to

New York law and P had a friend go into New York to record the mortgage in New York County where the building was situated. D had never
been in New York and had no connection with New York except for the
ownership of the property. Upon D's default on payment of the principal

to the extent of $150,000 P comes into New York and seeks to base jurisdiction on the ownership provision of Section 302 of the CPLR, since the
building on foreclosure will only sell for $100,000.

Can New York assert personal jurisdiction on this provision and
enter a judgment for the balance due on the bond? Has the cause
of action arisen from the ownership of property within the state?
Absent considerations of forum non conveniens, a literal reading
of the provision would seem to confer jurisdiction if the transaction which culminated in the execution of the mortgage could be
construed as having a substantial relation to the ownership of the
property in New York.94 It is to be noted that this factual situabeing the
91 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331: '.. . . any non-resident ..
owner, tenant, or user, of real estate . . . and the footways and curbs
adjacent thereto. . . . See Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C.
61 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1938).
92366 Pa. 343, 77 A.2d 360 (1951).
See Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D.
& C. 557 (Philadelphia County Ct 1954).
93 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (6) (2) (Supp. 1962).
94 This would require construing "substantial relation" as equivalent to
..arising out of." It would seem to fall within the "minimum contacts"
requirement and the draftsmen of the CPLR have demonstrated their intent

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 37

tion emphasizes lack of contact with the forum other than the ownership of property. In many instances where the solicitation, negotiation and execution of the bond and mortgage take place in
New York, the practitioner might also be able to avail himself of
the provision relating to the "transaction of business" as well as
that relating to the "ownership of real property."
The significant effect of the ownership provision is that it may
serve to confer in personam jurisdiction and its consequent effect
of full faith and credit in an area where only quasi in rem jurisdiction could have been acquired. The restrictions imposed by
quasi in rem ju'isdiction-that judgment could be rendered only
to the extent of the property within the state-would be overcome
where there was a substantial relation between the ownership or
possession and the cause of action. It should also be noted that
there will be a definite interplay between the ownership provision
and the traditional in rem action. Like the rest of the provisions
of section 302, many of the jurisdictional questions raised do not
lend themselves to easy solution and future litigation in this area
while attempting to resolve many of the problems, might very well
raise even greater problems.
The expanding jurisdictional concepts represented by section
302, while presenting problems, "is based on the premise that pers6ns" in the state should be permitted to protect their interests by
resort to the courts of the state." 95
Section 303
Up to this point, discussion of in personam jurisdiction has
been primarily concerned with defendant's contacts with the state.
The CPLR, as does the CPA, 96 provides for the acquisition of
jurisdiction where a "person not subject to personal jurisdiction"
institutes an action in the state by providing that the commencement of such an action, with certain limitations, "is a designation
by him of his attorney appearing in the action or of the clerk of
the court if no attorney appears, as agent, during the pendency of
the action, for service of a summons ....,,97 It applies to "a separate action brought against the plaintiff by the defendant in an
action first brought against him by the plaintiff." 98 The condition
to reach the limits of that requirement: "To make it possible, with very
limited exceptions . . . to take full advantage of the state's constitutional
power over persons and things." SECOND REP. 37.
95 SECOND REP.
2

96 CPA § 27-a.
1959).

37.
See PRASHKER. NEW YORK PRACTICE

97 CPLR § 303. See SECOND REP. 41.
98 PRASHKER, op. cit. supra note 96, at

232.

§ 99A (4th ed.
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imposed is that "such separate action would have been permitted
as a counterclaim had the action been brought in the supreme
court." 91 Further, the applicability of this section is limited to use
against persons not subject to personal jurisdiction, thereby eliminating any problem caused by the distinction between domicile and
residence. 100
With the exception of the appearance provisions, 101 sections
301, 302 and 303 basically cover the grounds for acquiring in personam jurisdiction under the CPLR. Article 3 of the CPLR then
makes provision for the acquisition of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
Section 314
Section 314 of the CPLR provides for situations where personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained-in rem and quasi in rem
actions. It lists the situations: (1) in a "matrimonial action," (2)
in actions affecting specific real or personal property within the
state, including an action of interpleader or defensive interpleader,
and (3) in actions pursuant to an order of attachment and actions
for the replevy of a chattel. The section is based on Section 232
of the CPA.1 2 Replevin has been added to the in rem or quasi in
rem actions.
Subdivision one, relating to matrimonial actions, is substantially unchanged. The full scope of the term "matrimonial action"
is provided by Section 105(m) of the CPLR which results in a
language change over Section 232 of the CPA. 10 3 As a result of
the case of Williams v. North Carolina,10 4 it is established that a
court can exert in rem jurisdiction over the marital res when the
plaintiff is domiciled within the state. Such jurisdiction can be
exercised where the action is to annul a marriage, or to decree a
divorce or separation. It cannot be exercised with regard to alimony and costs, which require in personam jurisdiction, unless the
defendant appears generally in the action or there has been a prior
seizure of his property within the state.10 5
99 CPLR § 303.

100 SECOND REP. 42.
See textual discussion infra p. 320.
301 CPLR § 321, RR. 320, 322.
' 0 2 SIXTH REP. 40.
103 CPLR § 105 (m): "The term 'matrimonial action' includes actions.

for separation, for an annulment or dissolution of a marriage, for a divorce,
for a declaration of the nullity of a void marriage, for a declaration of the
validity or nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce and for a declaration of
the validity or nullity of a marriage."
104 325 U.S. 226 (1945); 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
105 See, e.g., Geary v. Geary, 272 N.Y. 390, 399-400, 6 N.E.2d 67,71 (1936);

Reschofsky v. Reschofsky, 272 App. Div. 694, 74 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1st Dep't
1947). See Waters v. Waters, 28 Misc. 2d 689, 212 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct
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Subdivision two enumerates the situations for the acquisition of
in rem jurisdiction over real and personal property within the state,
including an action of interpleader or defensive interpleader. As
related to real property, its predecessor 106 had been interpreted as
conferring in rem jurisdiction in an action for the specific perwithin the state,
formance of a contract to convey real property
10 7
where the defendant vendor was a nonresident.
It should be mentioned that there might be a definite overlapping in the area of real property between the in rem provision
and Section 302(3) of the CPLR-the ownership, use or possession of real estate within the state. A literal construction of section
302(3) might allow in personam jurisdiction where previously only
an in rem proceeding could be had.
The inclusion of interpleader and defensive interpleader in
subdivision two, however, when considered in relation to Section
08
1006(g) of the CPLR, raises certain constitutional questions.
Section 1006(g) and its counterpart, Section 286-2 of the CPA,
are "designed to meet the problem of affording the stakeholder a
complete adjudication though some of the claimants are nonresidents and not subject to personal jurisdiction." 109 Where the subject of the action of interpleader or defensive interpleader is property located within the state, and in the stakeholder's possession,
jurisdiction can be predicated on the in rem or quasi in rem concepts. However, where the subject matter is money, such as a
debt of the stakeholder, it has been held that such an action requires in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident." 0 This may
result in multiple liability of the stakeholder. Section 10 0 6(g)
seeks a solution by providing that a stakeholder may upon order
of the court pay in a sum of money or part of it into court where
the determination is one of a right, interest or lien upon a sum of
money, whether liquidated or unliquidated, payable in the state pursuant to a contract or claimed as damages for unlawful retention of
specific real or personal property within the state. The sum of
money is deemed specific property within the state within the mean-

1961) (court asserted jurisdiction in separation action but would not award
alimony because there was no in personam jurisdiction).
106 CPA § 232.
107 Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N.Y. 261, 162 N.E. 73 (1928).
108 It has been held that interpleader is an in personam action and thus
requires personal jurisdiction over the non-resident claimant. New York
See the criticism of the
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
Dunlevy case in Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d. 338, 348, 316 P.2d
960, 966 (1957), appeal denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
109 1960 N.Y. LE. Doc. No. 20, FOURTH PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 170 (hereinafter cited as
FOURTH REP.).
110

Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
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ing of Section 314 of the CPLR where there has been compliance
-with the court order. This provision as initially recommended was
based on a trend toward liberalization of the areas where in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction has been allowed by the United States
Supreme Court."'
A different approach to the same problem is that represented
by Section 216 of the CPLR which provides a statute of limitation of one year from notice to the claimant which operates to
preclude the nonresident claimant from suing in the courts of New
York after expiration of the statutory period."12 Its effectiveness3
is limited since the claimant can still bring suit in another state."1
Another approach to the problem is provided by Section 287
of the CPA which provides for a Compact among complying
states.1 4 It proposes to allow for the acquisition of in personam
jurisdiction by personal service upon the nonresident in another
state or country, which is a member to the Compact." 5 Although
there seems to be no question of its constitutionality, 10 it lacks
effectiveness because New York has been unable to enlist the membership of its sister states.
The proposed solutions to the problem presented in the interpleader area once again point up the fact that state courts are on
the threshold of jurisdictional acquisition.
Though the expansion of jurisdiction will operate to solve
many of the problems which state courts have been faced with in
the past, it will also give rise to many problems. As state courts
tend to assert more jurisdiction over nonresidents through the
"minimum contacts" tests, the question of notice will take on more
significance. The Supreme Court has demonstrated its intent to

Ill See TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 283-84 (1954)
where the Judicial Council cited Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S.
428 (1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). But compare the Judicial Council Report with Zimmerman, Wendell
& Heller, Effective Interpleader Via Interstate Compacts, 55 COLUm. L. REv.

56, 58 (1958).
Further, the vitality of the Standard Oil case has become
ineffective. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
112 CPA counterpart, CPA § 51-a (the claim or part thereof must exceed

$50).

113 Another state or foreign country does not have to recognize the period
of limitation set by New York. Solicitor for the Affairs for His Majesty's
Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 448 (1952).
114

Initially recommended in 1954. TWENTIETH ANNUAL RPORT OF THE
284 (1954). See Zimmerman, Wendell & Heller, Effective

JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Interpleader Via Interstate Compacts, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 56 (1955).
115 This purports to accomplish among member states the result accomplished under the Federal Interpleader provisions where the district courts
have nationwide service of process. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
For a good discussion of Federal Interpleader, see Ilsen & Sardell, Interpleader in the Federal Courts, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1960).
6
TWENTETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 288-90 (1954).
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require actual notice where humanly possible. The revisers in drafting the service provisions of the CPLR, have designed its provisions to in fact give actual notice.
SERVICE

Due process requires a method of notice reasonably calculated
to afford parties interested in a judicial proceeding the opportunity
to appear and be heard.1 7 Under the CPLR this is generally accomplished by service of summons, or, in the case of a special
proceeding, by service of either a notice of petition or an order to
show cause." 8 The summons should state the plaintiff's basis of
venue, and if venue is based on the plaintiff's residence then his
residence should be specified." 9 In matrimonial actions, where the
summons is not accompanied by a complaint, the summons must
have legibly written or printed on the face thereof the words "Action to annul a marriage," "Action for a divorce," or "Action for
a separation," as the case may be. 120 In addition, if the plaintiff's
claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation
be made certain, the complaint need not be served with the summons in order for a default judgment to be entered. The plaintiff
may serve with the summons a notice stating the sum of money
for which judgment will be taken in case of default 121 and this will
allow the clerk to enter such 122default judgment without the plaintiff
having to apply to the court.
In case there is some unsubstantial defect in the summons the
court will usually allow this to be corrected by an amendment.
However, the CPA has been strictly construed so that certain deThe
fects that are actually unsubstantial are not amendable.12
CPLR provision is designed to eliminate this type of construction
n 7 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).

118 CPLR § 304. It is interesting to note that all provisions affecting real
property in the CPA have been placed in a new consolidated law to be
known as the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. Under this law all
special proceedings involving real property, including a summary proceeding
to recover possession of real property, will be commenced by service of
petition and a notice of petition. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTiONS & PROCMINGS
LAW §§711, 731.
119 CPLR R. 305(a).
120 1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1214. (Effective September 1, 1963 as § 232 of
the Domestic Relations Law.)
121 CPLR R. 305(b).
122 CPLR § 3215(a).
123 SECOND REP. 154, citing Friedman v. Prescetti, 199 App. Div. 385, 192
N.Y. Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1922) (insufficient papers on motion for order
for service by publication).
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summons to be amended
in all cases, if the de24
are not prejudiced.1
court directs a new party to be brought into the
order is not made upon the application of such

party, a supplemental summons directed to him is issued.125

But if

a supplethe new party is brought in upon his own application,
1 26
mental summons need not be served upon him.
Personal delivery of the summons to the party to be served
within the state continues to be the usual method of service under
the CPLR.' 27 As an alternative method, except in matrimonial
actions, delivery to the defendant's designated statutory agent is
also available.' 28 Under rule 318, any person can be designated by
a corporation, partnership, or natural person as their agent for service. The designation must be in writing with the consent of the
agent endorsed thereon, and must be filed in the office of the clerk
of the county where the person or organization making the designation resides or has its principal office.' 29 Unlike the CPA, the new
be executed and
provision does not require that the designation
30
acknowledged in the same manner as a deed.1
If the person to be served is a natural person within the state,
delivery to such person will, of course, be sufficient.' 31 However,
if the defendant is a domestic or a foreign corporation, the summons
must be delivered to an officer, director, managing or general agent,
cashier, assistant cashier or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law.1 32 Under Section 229(3) of the CPA an
assistant cashier, a director or managing agent of a foreign corporation cannot be served if service can be made upon one of
the officers specified in section 229(1) or upon the Secretary of
State. Yet, any of the officers specified in section 229(3) can be
served, in the first instance, if the defendant is a domestic corporation. 133 Section 311(1) of the CPLR eliminates his statutory
REP. 154.
R. 305(a).
126This was the interpretation given to §219 of the CPA. 3 CARMODYWArt, CycLOPEDiA OF NEW YORK PRAcTicE 106 (1953). As there is no
substantial change in the CPLR it would appear that this reasoning is
applicable thereto.
127 CPLR §308(1).
128 CPLR § 308(2).
129 CPLR R. 318. The designation remains effective for three years unless
it is revoked by the filing of a revocation, or by the death, judicial
declaration of incompetency or legal termination of the agent or principal.
The term "legal termination" is intended to cover the time when the
particular entity is no longer amenable to suit. F~rnH REP. 278.
130 Conpare CPLR R. 318, w.ith CPA §227.
131 CPLR § 308(1).
132 CPLR §311(1).
33
1 CPA § 228(8),(9).
124 SECOND
125 CPLR
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distinction between persons who may be served on behalf of a
foreign as compared to a domestic corporation. In light of the fact
that the process server often does not know whether the corporaor foreign, this innovation would seem to be
tion is domestic
13 4
desirable.
In the case of a domestic or licensed foreign corporation, service can also be effectuated by delivering duplicate copies of the
summons to the Secretary of State. It is then the Secretary's duty
to mail a copy of the summons to the defendant corporation. 35 In
addition, under Section 307 of the Business Corporation Law which
becomes effective! on September 1, 1963, an unauthorized foreign
corporation is deemed to have designated the. Secretary of State
as its agent for service of process in any action arising out of its
doing business within this state.' 30 In this case, in addition to
delivering the summons to the Secretary, the plaintiff must thereafter give notice to the corporation by delivering a copy of the
summons to the corporation without the state or by sending a copy
of the summons to the corporation by registered mail. Furthermore, proof of service must be filed within thirty days of such
service. Since the failure to comply with these numerous provisions could possibly result in a jurisdictional defect, an attorney
might be reluctant to use this section. If he chooses not to, fortunately, by virtue of Section 302 of the CPLR, the necessary jurisdictional predicate will always exist where the cause of action arises
from the doing of business within this state. That being the case,
the CPLR provides, as will be discussed later, that service can be
state in the same manner as service is made
made without the
137
within the state.
In addition to the 318 statutory agent, provided for in the
CPLR, the Business Corporation Law provides that a domestic
or authorized foreign corporation can designate a natural person
who is a resident of and has a business address in the state or a
domestic or a licensed foreign corporation as an agent for service
of process. 138 This designation must be registered with the Department of State in Albany. Unlike the 318 agent, whose designation remains in effect for only three years, this agent's designation
has no such time limitation.
Personal service on other types of business organizations is
substantially unchanged by the CPLR. For instance, with respect
134 SECOND REP. 161.
135 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW

§ 217; N.Y. SrocK CORP. LAW § 25. This
method of service is retained in § 306 of the Business Corporation Law which
becomes effective on September 1, 1963.
136 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 307.
137 CPLR § 313.
138 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 305.
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to partnerships, both the CPA and CPLR allow the partners to
sue or be sued in the partnership name. Also personal service
upon any partner within the state will be sufficient notice to the
partnership. 139 With respect to unincorporated associations, if the
action is brought against the president or treasurer on behalf of
such association, service of summons upon either of these officers
is permitted . 4 0
Moreover, if the association is doing business
within this state and has designated the Secretary of State as an
agent upon whom service of summons can be made, the association may be served by personally delivering to the Secretary of
State duplicate copies of such process. 141 As in the case of a
domestic or licensed foreign corporation, the Secretary of State
is then required to send by registered mail a copy of the summons
to the association.
With respect to infants and incompetents, the provisions in
the CPLR are almost identical with those in the CPA.142 Whatever the particular age of the infant defendant, a copy of the summons must be delivered to the infant's parent or guardian, or if
there be none within the state, to the person having the care and
control of the infant or with whom he resides or in whose service
he is employed. If the infant be of the age of fourteen or over,
a copy of the summons must also be delivered to the infant. In
the case of judicially-declared incompetents, if a committee has been
appointed, service upon such incompetent shall be made by personally serving the summons within the state upon the committee
and upon the incompetent. The court in its discretion may make
an order dispensing with delivery of the summons to the incompetent defendant.
In the case of governmental subdivisions, the provisions designating persons upon whom process may be served are partially
modified by the CPLR. For instance, the CPA provides that if
the action is against the City of New York, service must be made
by delivering a copy of the summons to the mayor, comptroller,
corporation counsel or to any person designated in writing by any
of them to receive process in their behalf, which designation must
be filed in the office of the county clerk of the County of New
York. 43 Section 311(2) of the CPLR does not provide for service
on the mayor, comptroller or their designees. In addition, the CPA
requirement that a county be served by delivery of a copy of the
§222-a; CPLR §§310, 1025.
§ 13; CPA § 1025.
141 N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW §§ 18, 19.
For the purpose of this section
association means only a joint stock association or business trust. N.Y. GEN.
Ass'Ns LAw §2(4).
142 Compare CPLR § 309(a),(b), with CPA §225(1),(2).
143 CPA §228(1).
'39CPA

140 N.Y. GEz. Ass'Ns LAw
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summons to the chairman or clerk of the board of supervisors, the
county clerk, or the county treasurer and by delivering or mailing
another copy of the summons to the county attorney or to the
clerk of the board of supervisors has been changed by the CPLR to
require service only upon one county officer. 144 Referring to the
double service requirement, the revisers contended that it was both
onerous and unnecessary. 145 Unlike the CPA, the CPLR provides
for service upon a park, sewage or other district by delivering the
summons to the clerk, any trustee or any member of the board.1 46
With regard to judicial bodies, the CPA requirement that the summons be delivered to a majority of a court, board, or commission
47
has been altered to allow service on any one judge or member.
However, under both statutes, if the board or commission has a
chairman or other presiding officer the summons may be delivered
to such chairman or officer.
With respect to other public organizations, the CPLR leaves
the CPA requirements substantially unchanged. Service upon the
state is made by delivering the summons to an assistant attorneygeneral at an office of the attorney-general or to the attorney-general personally within this state.1 48 Service upon a city other than
New York City is made by delivering the summons to the mayor,
comptroller, treasurer, counsel or clerk of such city. 49
Service
upon a town is made by delivering the summons to the supervisor
or the clerk.' 5" A village is served by delivering the summons to
the mayor, clerk or any trustee of such village. 151 A school is
served by delivering the summons to the
clerk, any trustee, or any
152
member of the board of such school.
In addition to personally delivering the summons to the defendant or his statutory designee, a plaintiff can acquire in personam jurisdiction over a defendant by substituted service. 53 This
is accomplished by mailing the summons to the person to be served
at his last known residence and either affixing the summons to the
door of his place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of
abode within the state or delivering the summons within the state
to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of business,
dwelling house, or usual place of abode of the person to be served.
This method of service is available only if service cannot with due
144 Compare CPA §228(3), with CPLR

§ 311(4).

160-61.
'46 CPLR § 311(7).
147 Compare CPA § 1289, uth CPLR § 312.
148 CPLR § 307; CPA § 221.
149 CPLR § 311(3); CPA § 228(2).
150 CPLR § 311(5); CPA § 228(4).
151 CPLR §311(6); CPA §228(5).
152 CPLR § 311(7); CPA § 228(6).
153 CPLR § 308(3).
145 SECOND REP.,
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diligence be made by delivering the summons within the state to
the person to be served. It should be noted that service on a 318
agent does not have to be attempted in order for substituted service
to be available. Under the CPA, the plaintiff has to procure a
court order granting leave to effect such service.154 These orders
have been generally granted as a matter of course. Thus, this
requirement was considered wasteful of both lawyers' and courts'
time. Realizing this, the revisers eliminated the necessity of obtaining a court order.i5a
To complete substituted service, proof of such service must be
filed with the clerk of the court designated in the summons. Service will then be complete ten days thereafter. Unlike the CPA,
the CPLR does not specify the time in which the proof of service
must be filed.156 Although the revisers do not discuss this point
in their notes, the courts, in light of the specific requirement under
the CPA, will probably require the plaintiff to file proof of service
within a reasonable time after such service.
Under the CPLR, the substituted service provision is contained in section 308 which is entitled "Personal Service Upon a
Natural Person." The section then states that "personal service
upon a natural person shall be made. .. ." This raises the interestin question as to whether an agent is included in the concept of
a natural person. The problem is particularly acute in the case
of a corporation where the person to be served is always an agent.
In the past, the courts did allow substituted service upon a corporate agent. 57 It would seem that since the revisers did not
indicate a change of policy, the same practice will continue to be
followed. Moreover, this section seems to be concerned with enumerating the various methods of service rather than with specifying
whom to serve. Consequently, it would appear that substituted
service can be made upon an agent if he is the person to be served.
While it is believed that this conclusion is correct, the courts may
well interpret section 308 as applying to natural person defendants
only.
Despite the fact that section 308(3) does not specifically prohibit substituted service in matrimonial actions, it would seem that
this type of service will remain inapplicable in such actions.158 Primarily this is due to the courts' interpretation of Section 1167 of

15' CPA §§230, 231.
15 FIFTH REP. 266.
15 CPLR § 308(3). Section 231 of the CPA requires that proof of
service be filed within twenty days after the order is granted.
157 In the Matter of Lorenz-Schneider Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 842 (2d Dep't
1963).
158 It is interesting to note that in the Fifth Report this method of service
was specifically prohibited in matrimonial actions. FiFTH REP. 265.
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the CPA (now Section 232 of the Domestic Relations Law) 15 9
concerning a default judgment in marital actions. As this section
has no provision for granting a default judgment in instances of
substituted service, the courts have consistently held this method
of service inapplicable in such actions. 160 Thus, the revisers were
presented with the possibility that the only form of notice available
in this situation would be mere publication. As this method of
service is less likely to give notice to a defendant than is substituted service, the revisers, in order to remedy this problem, decided that an order for service by publication in marital actions
had to direct, if possible, that a copy of the summons be mailed
to the defendant.' 61
Where personal service cannot be effectuated by one of the
methods already discussed, service can be made by virtue of section 308(4), in such a manner as the court directs. 162 Thus, it
would seem that if the defendant's residence cannot with due diligence be determined, the court might order the plaintiff to mail the
summons to a place where the defendant would probably receive
it.'6 3 Furthermore, if the defendant cannot be located and his address is unknown, the court, in certain instances, may direct service
by publication even though the action is not in rem or quasi in
rem. 1 6 However, the application of this latter method, for the
purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction, is somewhat restricted
since it is less likely to give the defendant actual notice of the
proceeding. 6'
As already noted, Section 302 of the CPLR is designed to take
advantage of the constitutional powers of the state to subject nonresidents to personal jurisdiction when they commit certain enumerated acts within the state. To insure the effectiveness of this
provision, the revisers found it necessary to modify and enlarge
much of the existing law with respect to service of nonresident defendants. 166 As a result, where the proper jurisdictional predicate
exists, section 313, for the purpose of acquiring personal jurisdic1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1214. (Effective September 1, 1963.)
160 Weiss v. Weiss, 227 App. Div. 757, 237 N.Y. Supp. 56 (2d Dep't 1929)
(per curiam); Purvis v. Purvis, 167 App. Div. 717, 153 N.Y. Supp. 269 (4th
Dep't 1915) (per curiam).
161 SIXTH REP- 114.
159

162 CPLR § 308 (4).
163 See SECOND REP. 165;

cf. Skidmore v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
164 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(service by publication upon unknown beneficiaries was sufficient notice to.
deprive them of their rights to sue the trustee for negligence).
165 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (publication in local newspaper not sufficient notice to bind a person who has left a state, intending
not to return).
166 SECOND REP.

162-63.
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tion, authorizes service without the state to be made in the same
manner as service is made within the state. 167 Accordingly, if a
non-domiciliary or unlicensed foreign corporation commits a tortious act; transacts any business; or owns, uses, or possesses any
real property in New York, personal jurisdiction can be obtained
over such person or corporation on a cause of action arising out of
this contact by merely delivering the summons to the party to be
served without the state. 168 Parenthetically, it should be noted that
if the defendant is a domiciliary, or a corporation deemed "present"
in New York, personal jurisdiction can be obtained over such person or corporation on any cause of action by service without the
state.
To acquire personal jurisdiction, the CPA permits service on
-a domiciliary outside the state. 6 9 With respect to nonresidents
outside the state, however, personal jurisdiction can usually be
-obtained only where service upon a state officer or other designee
is specifically authorized by a special statute. 70 For instance,
-under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, if a nonresident operates a
motor vehicle in this state he will be deemed to have appointed the
Secretary of State as his agent for service in any action growing
out of an accident in which such nonresident was involved. 17'
When utilizing this statute the plaintiff is not only required to
-deliver a copy of the summons to the Secretary of State, but he
must give notice of such service and a copy of the summons to
the defendant by registered mail or deliver a copy of the complaint
and summons to the defendant without the state. Although these
special statutes will continue to be available, the practitioner, by
virtue of section 313, will be able in most cases, under section 302,
to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant by merely delivering the
summons to such defendant outside the state. However, in a particular case, these special statutes, having been construed and tested,
may be a less costly and more secure way of proceeding.
In view of the foregoing, suppose the plaintiff, proceeding
under the Motor Vehicle statute, served the defendant with a
summons and complaint without the state but failed to serve the
Secretary of State. As the method of service would have been
authorized under section 313, could the court permit the plaintiff
to amend his pleadings so as to acquire in personam jurisdiction
167
168

CPLR § 313.

169

CPA § 235.

Section 313 also authorizes service upon a nonresident administrator
or executor provided he represents a deceased who would have been subject
to in personam jurisdiction under sections 301 or 302 were he alive. FiFTH
REP. 271.
170 For a discussion of statutes applicable to nonresident defendants see
SECOND REP. 455-68. For a partial
171 N.
VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW

enumeration see note 207 infra.
§ 253.
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over the defendant? Since the method of service employed was
reasonably designed to give the defendant notice of the proceeding
against him, it would seem that the court would be exercising its
discretion properly if it allowed the amendment.
A further problem exists with regard to the permissibility of
substituted service outside the state. Since section 308(3) only
authorizes this type of service within the state, this problem could
prove to be troublesome. Unfortunately the revisers do not clearly
indicate whether section 313 was intended to authorize substituted
service outside the state. 172 However, it would seem that the language of the section is broad enough to cover this situation. In
any event, by virtue of section 308(4), the court clearly could direct service to be made in this manner.
Under the CPA, where service cannot be effectuated by personal or by substituted service -within the state, the court, if it has
jurisdiction over property of the defendant, in certain instances, may
order service of summons by publication. 178 In contrast to this the
CPLR authorizes service by publication only where "service can174
not be made by another proscribed method with due diligence."'
Accordingly this method of service will not be permitted unless
personal or substituted
service cannot be effectuated within or uith1 75
out the state.

Furthermore, the CPA limits the making of an order for service of summons by publication to particular classes of defendants
listed in section 232-a such as unknown defendants, residents avoiding service, or nonresidents absent from the state. The CPLR, on
the other hand, makes no such distinction. However, since personal service will have to be used whenever practicable, it would
appear that a list of defendants upon whom an order
for service
17
of publication may be made will be unnecessary.
Under the CPA, the order of service of summons by publication directs the summons to be published in two English-language
newspapers, not less than once a week for six consecutive weeks,
and that a copy of the summons be mailed to the defendant. 177
The order can dispense with the mailing, if the court is satisfied
172 The early proposals provided for service by certified or registered mail
in quasi in rem and in rem proceedings. This provision was deleted because
the revisers were of the opinion that mailing plus affixing the summons
to the door of the defendant's residence was a superior method of service.
Therefore the revisers apparently assumed that substituted service would be
zvailable without the state. FIFTr REP. 273-74.
17. CPA § 232.
174

CPLR § 315.

To acquire quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction, section 314 provides.
that "service may be made without the state by any person authorized by
section 313 in the same manner as service is made within the state."
176 SECOND REP. 166.
177 N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. R. 50.
175
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that with reasonable diligence the plaintiff cannot ascertain a place
where the party to be served would probably receive the matter
transmitted. The order also must state that personal service upon
the defendant without the state is equivalent to publication and
mailing. 7 8 It is interesting to note that except in matrimonial actions mailing will be eliminated under the CPLR.179 The revisers
realized that the mailing requirement was unnecessary because if
the defendant's address is known he could always be served in another manner and an application for service by publication should
be denied in the first instance.'8 0 The requirement that the summons be published in two newspapers will be retained, but only one
of them will have to be in English. In addition, the summons will
only have to be published once in each of four successive weeks.' 8'
Turning to the contents of the publication, the revisers indicated that the only change from the CPA will be the requireof the action be published
ment that a brief statement of the object
82
along with the summons and notice.'
Where the defendant defaults in appearing or pleading, and
the plaintiff desires to enter a default judgment, proof of service
is required as a condition of entry of judgment. 8 3 With the possible exception of substituted service, the proof can be filed at any
time prior to the entry of such judgment. 8 4 It should be in the
form of a certificate if the service is made by an authorized public
officer, or in the form of an affidavit if made by any other person. 8 5 Also, a writing admitting service by the person served is
adequate. The proof should specify the papers served, the person
who was served and the date, place and manner of service. In
addition, the fact that service was made by an authorized person
in an authorized manner should be stated.
Where a default judgment is rendered against a person who
was served with a summons other than by personal delivery to
178

CPA § 233.

179 CPLR R. 316.
180 SIxTH REP. 114; SECOND REP. 168.

181 Furthermore rule 316 requires the first publication to be made twenty
days after the order is granted. This is a substantial reduction from the

CPA rule which permits the first publication to begin three months after
the 82order is granted. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. R. 51.
1
SECOND REp. 168. Essentially the CPLR provisions relating to publication are a simplification of the provisions in Rules 50-52 of the Rules
of Civil Practice.

Therefore, the notice must still apprise the defendants

when and where the order and complaint have been filed. In addition,
where the order is brought to recover a judgment affecting real property,
the notice should also describe the property.
183 CPLR § 3215(e).
184 See PR AFSR, Nzv YORK PRAcTcE 158 (4th ed. 1959) for a discussion of similar provisions under the CPA.
185 CPLR R. 306.
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him or his 318 agent, Section 317 of the CPLR will allow him to
defend on the merits, notwithstanding the default, provided that the
court find that he was not personally given notice of the summons
in time to defend and that he has a meritorious defense. 186 To
utilize this section, the party seeking to defend must request permission to do so within one year after he obtains knowledge of
the entry of the judgment, but in no event more than five years
after such entry.' 87 Unlike the comparable provision in the CPA,
there is no requirement that the defendant acquire knowledge of
the judgment by written notice..' 8
Obviously, the basic purpose
of this section is to allow a defaulting party to open a default judgment and defend where the summons was served by substituted
service or by publication. However, the language would seem to
be applicable to other situations. For instance, if the person served
was a registered agent under Section 305 of the Business Corporation Law and such agent failed to notify the corporation, it would
seem that the section should be available to the defaulting corporation. But even if the section is construed not to apply to this
situation, the courts can open the default since they have inherent
89
discretionary power to permit a judgment to be set aside.'
APPEARANCE

Before examining the appearance provisions of the CPLR, one
basic distinction must be made. While the CPA distinguishes between general and special appearances, 190 the CPLR does not. It
provides that every appearance is the equivalent of personal service
unless a defendant questions the court's jurisdiction over his person.191 A defendant, making such a challenge, will prevent a plaintiff from taking a judgment by default because he has appeared.
But whether this appearance is a waiver of jurisdictional objections will depend upon the court's disposition of the jurisdictional
contentions in an. in personam action, or a defendant's activity after
186 Under Section 217 of the CPA if good cause and a meritorious defense
are shown, the court must grant the defendant's motion, whereas, under the
CPLR even if the conditions in sections 317 are satisfied, a literal reading
of the provision seems to indicate that the court will have discretion in
deciding whether or not to grant the motion.
187 CPLR § 317.
188 CPA § 217. Under the CPA, if written notice isn't served upon the
defendant, he can defend within seven years after the entry of the judgment.
189 Brown v. Brown, 58 N.Y. 609, 611 (1874); SECOND RFP. 169. Even
though section 317 is not applicable in an action for divorce, annulment or
partition, the court pursuant to this inherent power could allow a defendant
to open the default.
190 CPA §§ 237, 237-a.

191 CPLR R. 320(a).
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an adverse ruling in a quasi in rem or in rem situation. This distinction will be discussed in more detail.
The CPA provides for appearance by service of a notice of
appearance, copy of an answer, or a motion "raising an objection to
the complaint in point of law." 192 Rule 320(a) of the CPLR has
retained the first two methods, but has replaced the last with the
clause, "or by making a motion which has the effect of extending
the time to answer." For example, a motion pursuant to rule
321119 3 (motion to dismiss a cause of action or a defense) constitutes an appearance because subparagraph f of that rule grants
an automatic extension. While the grounds for such a motion
would constitute a general appearance under the CPA because they
are objections in point of law,'9 4 they are, under the CPLR, an
appearance because of the interplay of the extension of time provisions.193 Of course, whether or not the appearance will be deemed
a submission to the court's jurisdiction depends on whether or not
jurisdictional objections, pursuant to rule 3211 (a) (8),(9), are
joined with the other grounds in the motion to dismiss. If they
are, rule 320(b) and/or (c) expressly states that this appearance
is not a conferral of jurisdiction upon the court. In effect, this
manner of raising jurisdictional objections is analogous to the special appearance under the CPA.
Since the making of such a motion is an appearance, two
uncertainties which exist under the CPA are dispelled. Under
the CPA there is scant authority which holds that a motion to
make a complaint more definite and certain is not an appearance. 19 6
However, under the CPLR, 197 such a motion would entitle the
moving party to an automatic extension. Thus, it would be an
appearance because the motion has the effect of extending the time
to answer.
The second uncertainty exists where a defendant wishes to
secure an extension of time which usually arises when he was
served only with a summons. A demand for a copy of the complaint would not constitute an appearance under both the CPA
and the CPLR. 9 8 Therefore, if a defendant did nothing other
than make such a demand within the time allotted to appear, he
would be in default. In order to avoid this, he could either secure
§ 237.
CPLR R. 3211.
N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. R. 107; Montgomery v. East Ridgelawn Cemetery,

192 CPA

193
194

182 Misc. 562, 44 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd nzer., 268 App. D:v.
857, 50 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1st Dep't 1944).
19. CPLR RR, 320(a), 3211.
196 255 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Freeman, 120 Misc. 472, 199 N.Y. Supp. 519
(Sup. Ct. 1923).
197CPLR R. 3024(a),(e).
198 CPA §257; CPLR § 3012(b).
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an extension from plaintiff's attorney or the court. If he chose
the former, it is clear that this would not be an appearance which
would prevent a default.' 99 If he proceeded by the latter, there
is doubt. Under the predecessor of the CPA, it was settled that
this motion was not such an appearance. 20 0 Nevertheless, there seems
to be confusion under the CPA.2 0° This problem has been resolved by
the CPLR. Rule 320(a) provides that the mere making of a
motion, as distinguished from the court's disposition of it, constitutes
such an appearance if the motion has the effect of extending the
time to answer. For example, under the CPLR, a motion to dismiss or to correct a complaint entitles the moving party to an
extension of time to serve a responsive pleading after the court
disposes of such motion.2 0 2 Thus, by reference to rule 320(a),
this is an appearance because the making of the motion generated
the extension. However, when a defendant petitions a court for an
extension, the making of the motion does not generate the extension.
The court's disposition of it creates the extension. Thus, it would
seem that such a motion is not an appearance.
While the CPA only provides for three methods of appearing,
For example, in
courts recognized a "de facto appearance."
Henderson v. Henderson,20 3 the defendant purported to appear
specially in a divorce proceeding. In fact, he participated in the
merits by cross-examination. The court held that his conduct was
tantamount to a notice of appearance. Since Section 301 of the
CPLR provides that "a court may exercise such jurisdiction . . .
as might have been exercised heretofore," this "de facto appearance"
has probably been retained.
Having discussed the methods whereby one effects an appearance, attention should now be given to the time within which one
must appear. The CPA requires a defendant to appear within
twenty days of service of summons upon him.20 4 However, if a
plaintiff were proceeding pursuant to some special statute, as the
Vehicle and Traffic Law 205 (authorizing service upon a non-resident
motorist), a defendant would have twenty days to appear after the
provisions of that statute relating to completion of service had
been satisfied. The CPLR has retained the twenty-day provision.

199 Maushart v. Kelly, 10 App. Div. 2d 630, 196 N.Y.S.2d 326 (2d Dep't
1960); Muffett v. Logan, 15 Misc. 2d 734, 182 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
200Benedict v. Arnoux, 38 N.Y. Supp. 882 (1895); cf. Paine Lumber
Corp. v. Galbraith, 38 App. Div. 68, 55 N.Y. Supp. 971 (2d Dep't 1899).
2013 CARMODY-WArT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 377 (1953).
202 CPLR RR. 3211, 3024.
203 247 N.Y. 428, 160 N.E. 775 (1928) ; accord, Gundersheim v. Kurcer, 28
Misc. 2d 463, 218 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
204 CPA § 237.
205 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 253.
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However, if the method of service is one of those specified in rule
320 206 (generally methods other than personal delivery to the
defendant) then a defendant has thirty days to appear after service
is complete. For example, if there is service of summons upon an
official of the state authorized to receive it, this being one of the
enumerated methods, a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the
thirty-day provision. Thus, service pursuant to Section 253 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law would now permit a defendant thirty days
within which to appear (service pursuant to this statute is upon
the Secretary of State) .207 It should be noted that the thirty
days do not begin to run until service is complete. Similarly,
Rule 3012(c) of the CPLR provides that if the complaint is
served with the summons, in the same situations enumerated in

206

Rule 320(a) accords a defendant 30 days in which to appear when:
a. service is upon a defendant by delivery to an official of the state
authorized to receive it. CPLR R. 320(a);
b. service is upon an attorney of a plaintiff not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court for a cause of action that would be a

counterclaim to the plaintiff's action.

CPLR R. 320(a), §303;

c. personal service is upon a natural person by a means other than

delivery. CPLR R. 320(a), § 308(2),(3),(4) ;
d. service is without the state. CPLR R. 320(a), §§ 313, 314;

e. service is by publication. CPLR R. 320(a), § 315.
There is some question whether or not a corporate defendant whose agent
(appointed pursuant to rule 318) has been served is entitled to the 30 day
rule. This is so because rule 320(a) refers to the "318 agent" in section
308(2) which is concerned with service upon natural persons.
207 Some of the other statutes which provide for the completion of service
after it has been made upon a state official are:
a. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 306(b), 307(c). Service on a domestic
or licensed foreign corporation is complete when service is made
upon the Secretary of State. § 306(b). Service upon an unlicensed foreign corporation is complete ten days after filing with
the court clerk. § 307(c). (Effective September 1, 1963.)
b. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 250, as amended, 1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws

983. Service is complete when papers are filed with the court
.clerk. (Effective September 1, 1963.)

c. N.Y. INs.

LAW

§ 59-a(2)(d), as amended, 1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws

1003. Service complete when process and papers are filed. (Effective September 1, 1963.)
d. N.Y. NAy. LAW § 74. Service is complete ten days after filing
e.

with court clerk.
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRArFvc LAW § 253, as amended, 1962 N.Y. Sess.

Laws 1138. Service is complete when papers are filed With court
clerk. (Effective September 1, 1963.)
Article 3 of the CPLR also provides for completion of service when service
is made pursuant to §308(3) (substituted service) or rule 316 (service by
publication).
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rule 320(a), a 2defendant
will have thirty days within which to
08
serve an answer.

In addition to the methods of appearing, and the time within
which an appearance must be made, the effect of appearance should
be considered. The CPA provides that a general appearance is
the equivalent of personal service upon a defendant. 20 9 Thus, once
a defendant appears generally, he has waived his jurisdictional
objections. 210 The CPLR declares that an "appearance" has the
same effect unless jurisdictional objections are raised either in a
pre-trial motion or in the answer.21' When jurisdiction is predicated
on section 302, a plaintiff might include another cause of action
in his complaint. When this occurs a defendant might wish to
Cappear" in the 302 action, while preserving his jurisdictional
objections to the other cause of action. Section 302(b) allows a
defendant to do this.
In order to permit a defendant to challenge the court's jurisdiction over him, New York has always recognized the procedural
device of a special appearance.2 1 2 While a general appearance
under the CPA cures jurisdictional irregularities in a plaintiff's
214
pleading, 213 waives any objection to jurisdiction of the person,

and is tantamount to personal service within the state,215 a
special appearance enables a defendant to appear without submitting to jurisdiction.2 1 6 Under Section 237-a of the CPA,
jurisdictional objections can only be raised by motion. And while
that section only authorized objections to in personam jurisdiction,
the courts have held that one could appear specially in a quasi in
rem, 2 1 7 and presumably in an in rem, 218 proceeding, and that the

provisions of section 237-a would apply.219 The section allows
a defendant who made an unsuccessful special appearance to defend

208 CPLR §3012(c). This section provides for the 30 day extension in
every situation enumerated by rule 320(a), except one. Section 3012 does
not provide for service upon a natural person by means other than delivery.
It would seem that this was a misprint because the revisers clearly indicated
that it should cover this. See FIFTH REP. 265, 418.
209 CPA § 237.
210 Reed v. Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 36 N.E. 884 (1894).
211 CPLR R. 320(b),(c).
212 SIXTEENTH

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

197 (1950).

Priceman v. Dankert, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1953); accord,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Podgorny, 200 Misc. 934, 109 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
214 Reed v. Chilson, supra note 210.
215 CPA § 237.
216 CPA § 237-a.
217 Lynch v. Plesch, 8 Misc. 2d 612, 167 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
nem., 4 App. Div. 2d 945, 168 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dep't 1957).
218 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 App. Div. 2d 3, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st
Dep't 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
219 Ibid.
213

1963]

NOTES

on the merits without waiving his jurisdictional objections for
purposes of appeal. 22 0 It is further provided that a special appearance results in a stay of all further proceedings until the court
has decided the jurisdictional question. 221 However, there seems
to be some uncertainty as to whether or not an unsuccessful special
appearance in a quasi in rem proceeding would subject a defendant
to in personam liability. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 22 the plaintiff commenced a separation action and had the defendant's property
sequestered. The defendant appeared specially, contending that
since he had previously obtained a Nevada divorce the plaintiff
was no longer his wife, and that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction since there was no marital res. The court overruled his
objection and he then defended on the merits unsuccessfully.
On appeal, his jurisdictional arguments were again rejected. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division held that he was not subject to a
personal judgment for alimony, since the court had not obtained
in personam jurisdiction despite the unsuccessful special appearance.
But since the court indicated that this was not a "truly in rem
situation," the uncertainty remains.
Before indicating how this quasi in rem problem has been
resolved by the CPLR, it might be helpful to discuss the CPLR
provisions comparable to special appearance under the CPA. An
objection to jurisdiction under the CPLR 223 can be raised in the
answer or by motion, 224 while under the CPA it can only be raised
by motion. 225 Since the distinction between general and special
appearances is abolished under the CPLR 226 a procedure had to
be authorized that would allow a defendant to raise jurisdictional
objections without submitting to the court's jurisdiction. This has
been done by viewing appearance from two vantage points. Once
a defendant appears by methods provided by rule 320(a) without
joining jurisdictional objections, he has submitted to the court's
jurisdiction. 227 This is analogous to a general appearance under
the CPA. A defendant can also proceed by joining his jurisCPA § 237-a (2).
CPA §237-a(5).
222 Note 218 supra.
220
221

223 Jurisdictional objections in in personam, quasi in rem. and in rem
actions are expressly authorized. CPLR RR. 320(b),(c), 3211(8),(9).
Under the CPA there is some doubt whether or not one can appear specially
in a quasi in rem action. Cf. Peterfreund & Schneider, Civil Practice, 33
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1263, 1271 (1958). As is the case under a special appearance

under Section 237-a(5) of the CPA a defendant is entitled to an extenstion of

time in which to serve his responding pleading if his jurisdictional objection

is not sustained. CPLR R. 3211(f).
224 CPLR R 320(b),(c).
225 CPA § 237-a (2).
226 FOURTH REP. 184.
227 CPLR R. 320.
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dictional objections to his defense on the merits in the answer.
If he does this, while he has appeared in the sense that he prevents
a plaintiff from taking a judgment by default, the appearance is
not deemed a submission to the court's jurisdiction. 22 8 This is
comparable to the special appearance under the CPA. Assuming
a defendant proceeds in this manner when a court claims to have
in personam jurisdiction, his position will be the same as if he
had made a special appearance under the CPA. However, with
respect to the unsuccessful special appearance in the quasi in rem
situation, where there had been confusion despite the determination
in the Vanderbilt case, the CPLR resolves this uncertainty. Rule
320(c) now provides that an appearance, where jurisdictional objections are joined, is not a submission to the court's jurisdiction
unless a defendant proceeds on the merits and an appellate court
does not sustain his jurisdictional argument. Thus, a defendant
can object to jurisdiction over his property and, if unsuccessful,
may withdraw without becoming subject to in personam liability.
If he defends on the merits after an adverse determination on
the jurisdictional question, and an appellate court upholds the
jurisdictional finding, the judgment will be deemed to be one in
personam.
The quasi in rem proceeding is also linked with another
procedural device known as a limited appearance. This device
allows a defendant to defend on the merits, while limiting his
liability to the value of the attached property which was the basis
of jurisdiction over him. 229 This is not recognized in New York
under the CPA 230 and is rejected by Rule 320(c) of the CPLR
because an appearance without a joinder of jurisdictional objections
is a submission to the court's jurisdiction.
Having thus seen how a defendant appears, in what time he
must appear, the manner of raising jurisdictional arguments, the
question now becomes who may appear for a defendant. Under
both present and new law, an adult who is capable of defending
an action may appear in his own behalf or by attorney, while
231
a corporation or voluntary association must appear by attorney.
With respect to infants and persons judicially declared to be
incompetent, the CPLR has enacted a change. Under the CPA,
a guardian ad litem has to be appointed by the court.2 32 Under
228CPLR R. 320(b),(c).
2293 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 338 (1953).
230 Burg v. Winquist, 124 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1953); SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 192 (1950).
Accord, Perlak v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
231 CPA § 236; CPLR §321 (a).
232 CPA §§ 202, 208.
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the CPLR an infant may appear by the guardian of his property. 233

If there is no such person, a parent may appear. 234
petent appears by the committee of his property. 235

The incomWhere there

specified persons, a court must appoint a
are none of the above
23
guardian ad litem. 0
Before completing the discussion of appearance, reference
should be made to the necessity for authority of appearance by
an attorney in a real property action. The CPLR does not change
the CPA.2 3 7

Thus, while

a plaintiff's

attorney must

serve a

defendant with written authorization, a non-resident defendant's
attorney must file written authority with the clerk as if he were
serve the plaintiff's attorney with a copy
recording a deed, and
2 38
of notice of the filing
Section 240 of the CPA provides that if a party's attorney
died, became disabled, was removed or suspended before judgment,
then no proceeding should continue until thirty days after a notice
to appoint another attorney has been served. Section 321(c) of
the CPLR changes this in one respect, and clarifies it in another.
The CPA has been interpreted as giving the party an absolute
stay.2 39

Under the CPLR the stay will only be granted if the

court's permission has been secured.240 The revisers indicate that
this change will allow a court "to vary the rule in cases where

the stay . . . would produce undue hardships to the opposing party,
as where the time -to take an appeal . . . would run or where a

provisional remedy is sought and speed is essential." 241 The clarification occurred with respect to whether or not a party who
voluntarily discharges his attorney is entitled to the stay. Under
the CPA, there was minimal authority to the effect that such
a party should be entitled to the stay.2 42

The rationale of such a

position .was that the discharge rendered an attorney "disabled"
In opposition to this view, there
as to further participation.
was substantial authority based on the rationale that section 240
only applies where the disability was caused by some factor outside
of the control of the attorney and his client.243 While a literal

CPLR § 1201.
Ibid.
235 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
233

234

237 FOURTH REP. 191-92.
23s CPLR R. 322 (a), (b).
239 Heller v. Alter, 143 Misc.
240 CPLR § 321(c).

10, 255 N.Y. Supp. 627 (Munic. Ct. 1932).

241 FOURTH REP. 191. While the statute authorizes a thirty day extension
only, the above quotation might justify an extension of less than thirty days
where neither party will be prejudiced by such an extension.
242 Thomas v. Thomas, 178 Misc. 349, 34 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
243
Hendry v. Hilton, 283 App. Div. 168, 127 N.Y.S.2d 454 (2d Dep't
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reading of Section 321(c) of the CPLR might not answer this
problem, the revisers clearly state that a voluntary discharge does
not fall 2 within
the meaning of a removal or disability of an
44
attorney.

CONCLusION

Article 3 of the CPLR represents a definite shift in attitude
regarding the acquisition of jurisdiction in New York. The comprehensive scheme provided by section 302 has been designed to
ultimately replace the piecemeal provisions which presently exist.
However, in establishing the scheme, the draftsmen have left much
to judicial construction. This is a wise policy in an area where
the law is unsettled and where the facts of the individual case
play such a significant role.' By its emphasis on the distinction
between jurisdictional predicate and service, article 3 at once
reflects the constitutional theory utilized by the Supreme Court
under the due process clause and simultaneously provides a better
analytical approach for the practitioner.
Though the jurisdictional provisions are commendable on many
grounds, certain problems will result for which the revisers could
have provided certain guidelines. This is especially apparent in
the "commission of a tortious act" area. The problems of where
a tort is committed and of jurisdictional facts could well have been
discussed by the revisers so as to at least demonstrate the basic
approach intended in these areas.
However, the defects are minor and are outweighed by the
clarification and simplification that article 3 accomplishes. This is
reflected in the service provisions. Thus, by eliminating the
need for a court order in making substituted service, the draftsmen
have discarded a procedure which was somewhat burdensome and,
since the orders were almost always granted, really unnecessary.
Likewise, by providing for personal service without the state where
the proper jurisdictional predicate exists pursuant to section 302,
they have adopted an approach which is clear and simple and
designed to insure actual notice. By discarding the distinction
between foreign and domestic corporations in section 311, the
revisers have provided uniformity which reflects the fact that in
many instances the server does not know whether the corporation
is foreign or domestic.
The draftsmen have continued the wise policy of the Civil
Practice Act in the area of service-that these provisions be
1953); Davalos v Davalos, 283 App. Div. 699, 127 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't
1954) (per curiam) ; accord, Conn v. Conn, 204 Misc. 1069, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
244 Note 241 supra.
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designed to in fact give notice. As already mentioned, they
have expressly demonstrated the intent that service by publication
be utilized only as a last resort.
The appearance provisions of article 3 are consistent with the
revisers' attitude of streamlining and clarifying. Thus, the special
appearance has been discarded. Consequently, a defendant can raise
his jurisdictional objections by motion or answer. This obviates
the Civil Practice Act provision which restricted jurisdictional
objections to pre-trial motion.
In drafting the appearance provisions, the revisers have resolved certain problems that exist under the Civil Practice Act.
For example, there is uncertainty as to whether an unsuccessful
special appearance in a quasi in rem proceeding would subject a
defendant to in personam liability. Under the CPLR, it is clear
that such a defendant would not be subject to personal jurisdiction
when: (1) he withdraws immediately after an unsuccessful determination on the jurisdictional issue, or (2) he is ultimately
successful on the jurisdictional question in an appellate court.
The revisers are to be commended for largely accomplishing
the goals which they had set. It should be noted, however, that
while many problems are resolved, article 3 will itself present
certain problems, the answers to which will have to be provided by
judicial interpretation.

CORPORATE

DISTRIBUTIONS:
REINCORPORATION

THE LIQUIDATIONSITUATION

Introduction
As a means of strengthening the financial condition of corporations, statutory nonrecognition of otherwise taxable gain or
loss is permitted certain reorganization transactions. 1 These reorganizations are categorized by section 368.2 In this way, where
required by the exigencies of business, corporate structures may be
reshaped by the transfer and exchange of properties without incurring tax liability. 3

These transactions

cannot,

however, be

1 SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOzaE TAXATION 1616 (1960).

2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §368(a)(1)(A)-(F).
WARREN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1521-33.

3 Treas. Reg.. § 1.368-1(b) (1961).
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